Abstract. Dining cryptographers networks (or DC-nets) are a privacypreserving primitive devised by Chaum for anonymous message publication. A very attractive feature of the basic DC-net is its non-interactivity. Subsequent to key establishment, players may publish their messages in a single broadcast round, with no player-to-player communication. This feature is not possible in other privacy-preserving tools like mixnets. A drawback to DC-nets, however, is that malicious players can easily jam them, i.e., corrupt or block the transmission of messages from honest parties, and may do so without being traced. Several researchers have proposed valuable methods of detecting cheating players in DC-nets. This is usually at the cost, however, of multiple broadcast rounds, even in the optimistic case, and often of high computational and/or communications overhead, particularly for fault recovery. We present new DC-net constructions that simultaneously achieve noninteractivity and high-probability detection and identification of cheating players. Our proposals are quite efficient, imposing a basic cost that is linear in the number of participating players. Moreover, even in the case of cheating in our proposed system, just one additional broadcast round suffices for full fault recovery. Among other tools, our constructions employ bilinear maps, a recently popular cryptographic technique for reducing communication complexity.
Introduction
Anonymous message transmission is a fundamental privacy-preserving tool, both in the literature and in practice. Toward this aim, Chaum devised two seminal techniques: mixnets [10] and "dining-cryptographers" nets [11] , also known as DC-nets. Mixnets have seen broad exploration in the literature, and serve as the basis for several fielded anonymity systems, e.g., [3, 13, 17, 19] . (See [14] for a good bibliography.) DC-nets, by contrast, have remained relatively neglected, apart from a small scattering of papers, e.g., [1, 2, 11, 21, 22] . One reason for this is perhaps that DC-nets, unlike mixnets, cannot operate by proxy; in particular, the players operating a DC-net must be identical with those providing input. In many real-world cases, however, this is not necessarily a serious drawback, as in the Crowds system [19] , where participants provide mutual protection of privacy. Moreover, as formulated by Chaum for the case involving honest players, DC-nets have one very compelling feature unavailable in mixnets:
In a basic DC-net, anonymous message transmission may be accomplished by players in a non-interactive manner, i.e., in a single broadcast round.
Non-interactivity is of course very naturally attractive as a practical feature of system design. It also renders security definitions and proofs simpler than in the case of mixnets (for which formal definitions have been quite elusive).
There is a major drawback to DC-nets, however, and a large obstacle to their deployment: They are subject to straightforward jamming by malicious players. Such players can prevent the delivery of messages from honest participants, either by broadcasting invalid messages or even simply by dropping out of the protocol. Several valuable techniques have been proposed for addressing this problem, but to this point have had the limitation of requiring either unfeasibly intensive computation and/or multiple rounds of interaction among players.
Our first contribution in this paper is a set of techniques permitting the identification of cheating players with very high probability, while retaining the property of non-interactivity. The resulting DC-net constructions are computationally efficient: Assuming n players, they require each participant to perform a number of modular exponentiations that is linear in n during the broadcast phase. Any player, whether a participant or not, may perform a quadratic number of exponentiations for verification of the output. Indeed, the computational costs of our constructions are comparable to those of the most efficient mixnets (assuming n players processing n inputs). Our DC-net proposals are therefore reasonable for small sets of, say, some dozens of players.
Of equal importance, we propose techniques that permit recovery from lost or corrupted messages in a single, additional broadcast round, provided that there is a majority of honest players. Previous proposals have required multiple rounds for this purpose, or assumed a re-broadcast of messages. The computational costs for our recovery protocol are comparable to those for the basic messagetransmission protocol.
Although it is possible to detect cheating by a player in a non-interactive mix network, we maintain that under any reasonable set of security assumptions, it is not possible for such a mix network to recover from failure (and thus from cheating) by even one player without an additional round of interaction. Our reasoning is as follows. Suppose that we could recover the inputs of all participating players regardless of who participated. Then if a given player P i did participate, and furnished message m i as input, an adversary could determine m i by taking the difference between the set M of all messages submitted and the set M of all messages except that of P i (the adversary would obtain M by simulating the absence of P i ).
We describe two different DC-net constructions, which we characterize as short and long. In a short DC-net, the basic unit of message transmission is an algebraic group element. For such DC-nets, we propose techniques that detect cheating with overwhelming probability. A long DC-net, by contrast, permits efficient transmission of messages of arbitrary length essentially by means of a form of hybrid encryption. (It may be viewed as roughly analogous to a "hybrid" mixnet.) For long DC-nets, we describe techniques to detect cheating with high, but not overwhelming probability; an adversary in this case may feasibly perform some limited jamming of messages.
In both constructions, we make use of bilinear maps, cryptographic techniques that have achieved much recently popularity as tools for reducing protocol interactivity [5] . In consequence, the security of our constructions is predicated on the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption (DBDH) (see, e.g., [6] ), as well as the random oracle assumption [4] .
Organization In section 2, we explain the basic concepts of DC-net construction, and describe previous results on the topic. We present our formal model and other preliminary material in section 3. In section 4, we describe our short DC-net construction, followed in section 5 by presentation of our long DC-net proposal. We conclude in section 6. In the paper appendix, we offer security definitions and proofs for the protocols presented in the body of the paper.
Background
The intuition behind DC-nets is best introduced with a simple two-player example. Suppose that Alice and Bob possess k-bit messages m A and m B respectively. They wish to publish these messages anonymously, that is, in such a way that an observer cannot determine which player published which message. Suppose further that Alice and Bob share k-bit secret keys k AB (0) and k AB (1) , as well as a secret, random bit b. Alice and Bob publish message pairs as follows:
An observer can compute M A,0 ⊕M B,0 and M A,1 ⊕M B,1 , yielding the (unordered) message pair (m A , m B ). The origin of these messages, however, remains unconditionally private: Without knowing the secrets shared by Alice and Bob, the observer cannot determine which player published which message. Observe that this protocol is non-interactive, in the sense that once their secrets are established, Alice and Bob need not communicate directly with one another.
This basic protocol may be extended to multiple players P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n . Suppose that each pair of players (P i , P j ) shares a set of keys k i,j (w) for i, j, w ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, where k i,j (w) = k j,i (w).
Each player P i computes a vector of values as follows:
We refer to each message W i (w) as a pad, and refer to each value k i,j (w) as a partial pad. Observe that ⊕ n i=1 W i (w) = 0, i.e., the pads in a given position w cancel when XORed together.
To broadcast messages in this scheme, each player P i chooses a random position c i and XORs her message m i with the pad
e., the vector formed by XORing all messages in a given position), will consist of the set of messages posted by all players. Provided that keys and position selections {c i } are secret, the privacy of messages, i.e., the hiding of their originators, is unconditional.
As noted in Chaum's original paper, shared secrets may be established noninteractively via Diffie-Hellman key exchange, yielding computationally secure privacy.
A note on "collisions": Even when all players are honest, a problem arises in multi-player DC-nets in the selection of message positions {c i }. In particular, there is no good non-interactive means of enabling all players to select distinct message positions. Hence, with some probability, two (or more) players will attempt to transmit messages in the same slot. In other words, players P i and P j will select c i = c j , so that the message m i ⊕ m j appears in the final vector V , rather than the individual messages. Some multi-round DC-net protocols address this problem via reservation procedure, whereby players request "slots" in advance. In all cases, however, DC-nets involve collisions, whether of messages themselves or reservation requests. (The problem can be avoided through techniques like secure multiparty computation of a secretly distributed permutation of slots among players, but this is impractical.)
We do not treat the issue of collisions in this paper, but simply regard a DCnet as a primitive that provides only partial throughput, i.e., drops some fraction of messages. Better throughput may be achieved by high-layer protocols, e.g., protocol repetition, either serially or in parallel.
Previous work
As already explained, a basic DC-net is subject to jamming by even a single dishonest player. Such a player P i may simply set the vector V i to a series of random pads. This effectively jams the DC-net: All elements in the final output V will be random and thus no messages will be successfully delivered. Worse still, the very privacy guarantees of the DC-net render it impossible to trace the source of the jamming in this case. Alternatively, an attacker may corrupt messages by tampering with bits in a valid vector V i . It is on this security problem that the literature on DC-nets mainly focuses.
In his original paper [11] , Chaum proposes the detection of dishonest players via a system of "traps" in a multi-round protocol. Prior to message transmission, a reservation protocol takes place in which players reserve future message slots. At this time, each player commits to a declaration of "trap" or "non-trap" for her reserved slot. To jam the DC-net, a dishonest player must transmit a message in a slot she has not reserved. But if she tries to transmit a message in a slot that is a "trap," then the attack may be detected during a decommitment phase.
An important follow-up result is that of Waidner and Pfitzman [21] , who identify a weakness in this original protocol, and show that an attacker can feasibly strip the anonymity of honest players. (Improved reservation techniques in [2] and [22] reduce this possibility to some extent.) They propose a multiround solution to this problem, also based on the idea of setting "traps" during a reservation phase. Like Chaum's protocol, theirs is only guaranteed to identify one dishonest player for a given "trap." No obvious method for fault recovery is available, apart from re-broadcasting. That said, it should be noted that the goal of this work is a little different than ours. While these researchers have sought to achieve unconditional untraceability assuming only honest point-topoint communication, our aim is to achieve privacy under only computational hardness assumptions.
Most recently, in [1] , von Ahn, Bortz, and Hopper consider a constant-round anonymous-broadcast protocol that is essentially a DC-net variant (with an initial partitioning of players into autonomous groups). They accomplish the distribution of secrets for each protocol invocation via a secret-sharing protocol. In their scheme, the correctness of pads is proven via a cut-and-choose protocol. In the optimistic case, their protocol requires three broadcast rounds, and has O(n 2 ) communications complexity (assuming a constant number of cut-and-choose invocations). In the presence of cheating players, the communications complexity rises to O(n 4 ).
One problem with these previous protocols is that the computational and communications costs of catching cheating players with overwhelming probability is very high, requiring either many "traps" or many cut-and-choose invocations. This may not be problematic in cases where players may be reliably identified and where cheating carries a high penalty. For Internet systems, however, in which identities are not trustworthy, and participation in anonymous systems may be short-lived, even a small amount of cheating in the form of, e.g., tampering with messages, may be highly problematic. There is the risk that a savvy attacker may simply create false identities and then discard them when cheating is detected.
Our work is similar to the approach of von Ahn et al. in that we employ cryptographic proofs of correctness rather than "traps" in order to detect cheating. We employ a different strategy for pad computation, however, that has the benefit of more efficient proofs of correct pad computation. In particular, for our short DC-net proposal, in which players perform only a linear number of modular exponentiations (in n) on furnishing inputs, we show how to detect cheating with overwhelming probability. Another critical feature of our proposal is, of course, its non-interactivity in the optimistic case. Additionally, even in the presence of faults, our protocols may be completed in just two broadcast rounds, and with O(n 2 ) communications complexity.
Preliminaries
For the sake of simplicity, we assume throughout this paper the presence of a reliable broadcast channel. As is well known, such a channel may be simulated via Byzantine agreement in a network with reliable point-to-point delivery. (See [7] for recent results in this area.) Another possible instantiation would be a Web server that performs the function of receiving and publishing messages in an honest and reliable manner. (Our constructions may also be employed in the presence of an unreliable broadcast channel provided that a given message is seen either by all players or by none. In this case, a dropped message may be modelled as a faulty player.) We further assume that all messages are authenticated, i.e., securely bound to the identities of their originators. In practice, this may be accomplished via digital signatures. We define next the component functions of DC-nets. We denote the set of participants in the DC-net by P = P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P n . In what follows, when we specify a value as public or published, we assume it is transmitted to all players in P via an authenticated channel or entity. Setup is achieved by means of a parameter generation function paramgen and a key distribution function keydist. These functions are similar to those employed in standard discrete-log-based distributed cryptographic protocols. They are called once at the beginning to set up long-lived parameters shared by all players. A difference here, however, is that we employ admissible bilinear maps as a basic tool in our constructions, and must therefore make use of elliptic-curve based algebraic groups accordingly. We assume the appropriate background on the part of the reader, and refer to [5] for further details and notation.
-Parameter generation: Taking security parameter l as input, the function paramgen outputs a quintuple ρ = (p, G 1 , G 2 ,ê, Q), where G 1 and G 2 are two groups of order p, Q is a generator of G 1 andê :
an admissible bilinear map [5] . We require furthermore that the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption holds forê. Using the terminology of [5] , the function paramgen is a parameter generator that satisfies the DBDH assumption. (For our "long" DC-net construction, we may weaken our hardness assumption to the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem (BDH), i.e., the computational variant, rather than the decisional one.) In practice, the mapê may be instantiated with the Weil pairing over a suitable elliptic curve. The function paramgen may be executed by a trusted entity, which is our working assumption here. (Alternatively, it may be accompanied by a non-interactive proof of correct execution.) The quintuple ρ is published. We leave system parameters implicit in our notation where appropriate.
-Key generation: The function keydist takes as input the parameter specification ρ. It yields for each player P i a private key x i ∈ U Z p and a corresponding public key y i = x i · Q. Each private key x i is additionally shared among other players in a (k, n)-threshold manner. In particular, let f i be a polynomial over F p of degree k − 1 selected uniformly at random such that f i (0) = x i . Player P j ∈ P receives from player P i the private share x i,j = f i (j), with a corresponding public share y i,j = x i,j · Q. We assume that the function keygen is an algorithm executed by a trusted entity and a secure environment. (In practice, it may be instantiated by means of a distributed protocol; see [16] for an example of such a protocol and a discussion of the underlying security guarantees.)
We now describe the functions employed in the DC-net itself. We assume that players have access to a trustworthy global session counter s and specification Π s ⊂ P of players participating in the session s. Note that the privacy properties of our construction (defined in appendix A) do not rely upon publication of s or Π s in a trustworthy manner, but the robustness does.
The function post is invoked in session s by every player in Π s . It returns to each player a set of outputs that hides that player's input, as well as auxiliary data that proves the correctness of the outputs. More precisely, the function post is a randomized function that takes as input the session counter s, a message m i and the private key x i of player P i . Inputs to the function also include the set of players Π s participating in the sessions and all public keys. For visual clarity, we set off the latter parameters in square brackets. We define π s = |Π s | to be the number of participants in session s. The function post outputs: The function verify determines the correctness of the vector V output by a given player P i . When V is deemed correct, verify outputs '1'; otherwise it outputs '0'. This function can be called non-interactively by any player who wishes to verify the correctness of an output vector produced by another player.
Once all players in Π s have posted their output vectors, it should be possible for any entity to extract the messages input to the mix procedure. We denote by extract the function that accomplishes this. The outputs of extract is a set M of at most π s distinct messages.
Pad reconstruction:
If a player P i ∈ Π s fails to produce a correct output vector (or any output at all), a quorum of other players in Π s can reconstruct that missing output. We denote by reconstruct the function that accomplishes this.
We denote by DC = {paramgen, keydist, post, verify, extract, reconstruct} the complete set of functions constituting a DC-net.
Short DC-Net Protocol

Intuition and tools
In our first construction, the basic message unit is an algebraic group element. We would like to enable players to prove correct behavior in this setting with overwhelming probability. This combination of features leads to two basic problems:
Problem 1: We would like any given player P i to be able to compute a partial pad k i,j (w) with any other player P j in a non-interactive way. In fact, P i must be able to compute many such partial pads non-interactively, namely one partial pad for every value w. Additionally, P i must be able to prove the correctness of any partial pad k i,j (w) (or more precisely, of any pad, which is composed of partial pads).
The contradiction: Suppose that P i computes partial pad k i,j (w) using a standard D-H protocol employing her own secret key x i and the public key y j of player P j . (I.e., k i,j (w) = y x i j .) Since this computation is algebraic in form, P i can efficiently prove statements in zero knowledge about k i,j (w). On the other hand, it is only possible to perform this D-H computation once, and P i needs to do so for many different values of w! An alternative possibility is to hash y x i j with w to generate partial pad k i,j (w). In this case, though, there is no way to prove that k i,j (w) was correctly constructed with overwhelming probability without inefficient techniques like cut-and-choose or general secure function evaluation.
The solution: It is in resolving this problem that bilinear mapping comes into play.
3 It is possible to think of a bilinear map as a way of effecting a D-H exchange non-interactively across many different algebraic bases. In particular,
is a randomly selected elliptic-curve point specific to w. We may thus think of P i as performing a D-H exchange relative to a different algebraic baseê(Q, Q w ) for every different value of w.
Problem 2: When a player P i publishes a vector V of pads, she must prove its correctness. This means proving that every element of V is a correct padexcept the one element modified to contain the message m i that P i wants to publish. The problem here is that P i of course does not wish to reveal which element of V contains the message m i !
The solution: For each pad position w in her published vector, player P i commits to a bit b w . She lets b w = 0 if the element in position w represents a correct pad, and b w = 1 otherwise. P i then proves two things:
1. For every position w, either the pad is correct OR the bit b w = 1. 2. The sum w b w = 1, i.e., the vector V contains at most one message.
To prove both of these facts, we use standard techniques for non-interactive proofs regarding statements involving discrete logs. We do so over the groups G 1 and G 2 . As explored in many papers, these techniques permit honest-verifier zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of discrete logs [20] , proof of equivalence of discrete logs [12] , and first-order logical statements on such statements [9] . The proof protocols may be made non-interactive through use of the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [15] ; they may be perfectly simulated with application of the random oracle model to the hash function used to generate challenges. We draw on the notation of Camenisch and Stadler [8] for a unified treatment and formal specification of these proofs in our detailed protocol. (E.g., PoK{x : e = g x f = h x } means a proof of knowledge that log g e = log h f , and is NIZK for our purposes.)
Protocol details
Parameter and key generation. The function paramgen outputs the set of parameters ρ = (p, G 1 , G 2 ,ê, Q). We also assume the existence of a hash functions h : {0, 1} * → G 1 that is publicly known. The function keydist(ρ) then outputs a secret key x i ∈ Z p for each player P i . Recall that shares of this secret key are distributed to other players and that all public keys are published.
Message posting. The pads W i,s (k) for player P i in session s are computed as follows. We compute the point Q k = h(s||k) on G 1 and let
where δ i,j = 1 if i < j and δ i,j = −1 if j < i. Player P i then chooses at random a value c i ∈ Π s and multiplies the message m i ∈ G 2 with pad W i,s (c i ) ∈ G 2 to produce the output vector V i,s . We turn now to the computation of the auxiliary verification data σ i,s :
1. Let g and h be two fixed random generators in a group G of order q for which the discrete logarithm problem is hard. Player P i chooses independently at random n values r 1 , . . . , r n ∈ Z q . For 1 ≤ k ≤ n, where k = c i ,
The prover proves knowledge of log h (g −1 n i=0 w i ), i.e., PoK{r :
The string σ i,s consists of all the values computed in steps 1 and 2 above. Finally, the function post outputs (V i,s , σ i,s , i, s) . 
Recall that the definition of the pads is such that i∈Π s W i,s (k) = 1. We need now to introduce a notation for the subset of players who chose to publish their message in position k for a given k. For k ∈ Π s , we denote c Pad reconstruction. If a subset of players P ⊆ Π s fail to publish their output vector, the remaining players can reconstruct the pads of missing players, and compute the output of the DC-net, as follows. Each player P i for i ∈ P publishes x j,i · Q k for all j ∈ P. Anyone can verify the correctness of these values by checking thatê(Q, x j,i Q k ) =ê(y j,i , Q k ). Furthermore, these values enable any player to recompute the pads of missing player P j sinceê(Q k , y i ) xj can be derived from the valuesê(x j,i Q k , y i ) by polynomial interpolation.
Long DC-Net Protocol
Intuition and tools
In order to obtain a "stretched" pad of the desired length in our long DC-net, it is necessary to apply a PRNG to a secret seed K, i.e., to use symmetric-key techniques. In consequence, proofs based on the algebraic structure of pads are no longer possible, and there are no efficient techniques for effecting proofs with overwhelming probability. Our use of symmetric-key techniques thus engenders two basic problems:
Problem 1: We face the same basic problem as in the short DC-net: It is necessary to prove correct construction of vectors without revealing where the messages are positioned. But the use of symmetric-key primitives means that we cannot benefit from the same NIZK proof techniques as in the short DC-net.
The solution: We resolve this problem by employing proof techniques that detect cheating players with high, but not overwhelming probability. In particular, we use a technique very similar to that of "randomized partial checking" [18] for mixnets. The idea is for a player P i to prove correctness of her published vector V by generating a random challenge R non-interactively. This challenge R specifies a subset of half of the elements in the vector V . P i reveals the underlying seeds for these as part of her proof. These seeds are derived essentially just like pads in the short DC-net. Thus, it is possible to provide a simple proof of correctness that may be non-interactively verified by other players.
One problem, of course, is that if P i transmits a message m i , then with probability 1/2, the challenge R will lead to opening of the seed for the position containing that message. This problem may be resolved quite simply: P i chooses challenges until she finds one that does not lead to opening of the seed for the message position. Some tens of attempts will permit this with overwhelming probability.
Since only half of the seeds are revealed, some number of invalid pads can escape detection. In particular, for a given challenge, any seed will be revealed with probability 1/2. Hence, given u invalid pads, an adversary must perform work roughly 2 u to compute a challenge R that does not reveal cheating. In practice, therefore, we would expect an adversarial player to be unable to insert more than, say, 80 invalid pads into a vector. Thus such a player can "jam" only a limited number of slots. Assuming large enough vectors and adversarial control of a small enough set of players, the throughput for the DC-net remains fairly high.
Thus, our proof protocol is as follows. Let h be a hash function from {0, 1} * to Z n (modelled in our proof as a random oracle).
1. The player chooses a random seed r and computes h(V ||r||1), h(V ||r||2), . . . until all these values form a subset S ⊂ {1, . . . , n} of size |S| = n/2. Note that i = j does not imply h(V ||r||i) = h(V ||r||j) so that more than n/2 computations may be required to obtain the set S. 2. If i 0 ∈ S, the set S is discarded. The prover returns to step 1 and chooses a new random seed.
Step 1 is successful on average after 2 tries. 3. Otherwise, the protocol outputs the random seed r and the set S. For all j ∈ S, the protocol also outputs the secret key k j . 4. The verifier verifies that the set S is correctly computed from randomness r. For all j ∈ S, the verifier uses the key k j to verify the correctness of V j .
Problem 2:
Since the seeds used to compute pads in our long DC-net assume the same form as those in the short DC-net, the reconstruction procedure is very similar. The only difference in the process is that once a seed is recovered, the PRNG must be applied to obtain the corresponding pad. What we highlight, however, is that our use of bilinear maps is solving a fundamental problem in the long DC-net construction.
In the short DC-net, honest players could, in principle, make do without using bilinear maps. Indeed, they can reconstruct a pad in a verifiable way without revealing any long term secrets, by exploiting the algebraic structure of pads. (As explained in the footnote above, it is possible in principle to have, for example, secret keys {x i } that cancel, i.e., such that i x i = 0 mod q, thereby engendering pads that "cancel." Note that this results in a very cumbersome key setup.) In the case of long DC-nets, however, there is no good way to do this. Briefly stated, the application of the PRNG eliminates algebraic structure on the pads.
The only way, therefore, to achieve "cancellation" of pads in a long DC-net, is for pairs of players to share secrets. But as already noted, in a standard setup without bilinear maps, it is possible for a pair of players (P i , P j ) to establish a shared secret S non-interactively only once through application of D-H to their public keys. This secret S can be used to generate new secrets for multiple sessions through application of symmetric-key primitives, e.g., secrets may be generated as h(S, 1), h(S, 2), . . .. But without expensive general techniques, there is no way to reconstruct a given secret h(S, w) without revealing S itself and consequently compromising all shared secrets between P i and P j .
The solution: This is where bilinear maps are helpful. As explained above, the intuition is that for a single pair of public keys, a bilinear map may be thought of as permitting non-interactive D-H key establishment across many different algebraic bases. Thus, each seed may be reconstructed individually by honest players holding shares of the private keys of P i and P j . Under the (Bilinear) Diffie-Hellman assumption, this may be accomplished without compromising the privacy of other seeds. (In algebraic terms, one seed might assume the form S 1 = g 1 x i x j , while another assumes the form S 2 = g 2 x i x j . Provided that g 1 and g 2 are random, knowledge of S 1 does not permit computation of S 2 .)
Protocol details
In this section, we define our long DC-net protocol and highlight the differences with the short DC-net. The main differences between the long and short schemes lie in the definition of the auxiliary data σ i,s and the verification algorithm.
Parameter and key generation. This step is nearly identical to the short protocol. The function paramgen outputs parameters ρ = (p, G 1 , G 2 ,ê, Q). As in the short protocol, we use a hash functions h : {0, 1} * → G 1 . We also assume the existence of a publicly known pseudo-random number generator f : G 2 → {0, 1} l , where l is the length in bits of messages processed by the long DC-net. (For the purposes of our proofs, we model this as a random oracle.) The function keydist(ρ) distributes keys to all players. Pad reconstruction. If a subset of players P ⊆ Π s fail to publish their output vector, the remaining players can reconstruct the pads of missing players, and compute the output of the DC-net, as follows. Each player P i for i ∈ P publishes x j,i · Q k for all j ∈ P. Anyone can verify the correctness of these values by checking thatê(Q, x j,i Q k ) =ê(y j,i , Q k ). Furthermore, these values enable any player to recompute the seeds of missing player P j since the valueê(Q k , y i ) xj can be computed from the valuesê(x j,i Q k , y i ) by polynomial interpolation. The pads themselves may then be computed through application of f .
Conclusion
We have proposed two new DC-net constructions. Unlike previous DC-net proposals, our constructions allow for efficient detection and identification of cheating players with high probability. When cheating is detected, a single additional broadcast round enables full fault recovery. Our DC-net protocols are thus resilient to the jamming attacks that negated the simplicity and non-interactivity of earlier DC-net proposals.
